OceanGate’s and Stockton Rush’s patents tell us more than the company did.
Zachary Silbersher
Towards the end of last week, we learned of the sad and unfortunate fate of the five passengers aboard the OceanGate Titan submersible. This tragic episode has raised several questions, most of which are beyond the scope of this blog or this post. Yet, what is encompassed within the scope of this blog is that OceanGate had four granted U.S. patents. Is there anything we can learn about this tragic episode from those patents?
I previously blogged twice about the Theranos debacle. In each of those posts, the thesis was that Theranos’ patents offered blatant reasons, in full view of the public, why the company’s claims to investors were likely problematic. Because companies often have to pull up their skirt in front of the Patent Office in a way they typically don’t in front of the public, patents often tell their own unique story that press releases, marketing materials and pitchbooks do not. In the case of OceanGate, the company’s patents highlight that it was likely putting far too much emphasis on an early-warning detection system as its primary safety-mechanism against hull failure.
Among all four U.S. patents acquired by OceanGate, the sole inventor was its CEO, Richard Stockton Rush, III. Three of the patents, including U.S. Patent Nos. 9,381,980, 10,259,540 and 11,027,805, appear to be directed to launching and docking a submersible in an aquatic environment using a submersible platform. In the words of these patents, the inventions are generally directed to “a simple vessel and payload launch and retrieval system that permits the safe deployment and retrieval of equipment and vessels in heavy sea conditions, and that does not require substantial vessel or personnel support or active depth control systems.”
The fourth patent is more interesting. The patent is U.S. Patent No. 11,119,071, and it is relatively new. It was initially applied for in 2017, and it issued in 2021. The patent is generally directed to using “acoustic emission detectors” placed around a submersible vessel made of a composite structure. The detectors are used to analyze, in real-time, the safety, integrity and potential failure of the composite structure. The patent also includes features for measuring the strain at locations where the composite structure is located in close proximity to other materials, such as metal or plastic. The patent also includes features for determining whether real-time acoustic measurements at a specific depth or pressure exceed prior measurements for the same depth or pressure. The patent also contemplates setting off an alarm when that happens.
This patent is interesting in light of a former OceanGate engineer who was reportedly terminated after raising concerns over the safety of the carbon fiber hull of the Titan. David Lochridge, who was purportedly the former Director of Marine Operations, was fired following his report that identified potential safety concerns with the Titan’s carbon fiber, including “visible flaws.” In particular, Lochridge allegedly complained that those flaws could be exacerbated and expand into large tears during enormous pressure changes as the submersible descended to the ocean floor.
Lochridge’s allegations were set forth in a lawsuit filed 2018, i.e., several years before the Titan’s failure. OceanGate initially sued Lochridge for breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets, among other claims. In response, Lochridge countersued for wrongful termination. Lochridge’s allegations described below are taken from his counterclaims. Both parties appeared to deny the other side’s allegations. Before reaching the merits, the case was settled within four months of being filed.
As set forth in more detail in the lawsuit, Lochridge apparently recommended more thorough testing that would go farther towards ensuring the hull was safe. This included non-destructive safety testing to “check for delaminations, porosity and voids of sufficient adhesion of the glue being used due to the thickness of the hull.” Lochridge was particularly concerned about the lack of this testing after he learned that the hull’s manufacturer only certified the submersible to depths of 1,300 meters even though OceanGate intended to take passengers to depths of 4,000 meters.
In response, the company, including its CEO Stockton Rush, purportedly rejected Lochridge’s recommendations. OceanGate allegedly did not believe any form of equipment existed that could perform the non-destructive testing he recommended. Instead, the company purportedly intended to rely solely upon its acoustic monitoring system that would be installed on the submersible to detect the beginnings of a hull breakdown and structural failure.
Lochridge allegedly also had concerns that the acoustic monitoring system was insufficient to save any lives in the event the hull begins to fail. Rather, he believed—way back before 2018—that the acoustic detection system may only detect failure within milliseconds before an implosion.
James Cameron, the famed director the movie Titanic, and also an experienced deep-sea explorer, has been notably vocal following the tragedy of the Titan. Cameron believes that the acoustic monitoring system may have actually provided the passengers much more advanced notice of the hull’s impending failure than just a few milliseconds. Indeed, the Titan had dropped their ascent weights, which is an indication they were attempting to quickly ascend to the ocean’s surface, suggesting they were responding to an alerted emergency. Yet, Cameron also offered that, if a warning system is your entire idea of safety, “then you’re doing it wrong.”
The company was using an experimental hull design to ferry tourists to depths of the ocean that are extremely dangerous. We know that OceanGate was previously warned by more than a dozen industry leaders in the deep-sea community that its “experimental” approach was very risky. We also know that, despite that, in a 2019 blog post, the company waved away further safety testing under the pretense that “[b]ringing an outside entity up to speed on every innovation before it is put into real-world testing is anathema to rapid innovation.”
In other words, Stockton Rush argued that safety gets in the way of innovation. But, that begs the question—where was the evidence of his rapid innovation? The company only has four U.S. patents. Three of them are directed to docking and launching the submersible. The fourth is directed to an acoustic detection system for alerting passengers of hull failure. That’s it. Nothing else about the integrity of the structure or the novelty of the hull design or the purported reasons why OceanGate’s innovative and experimental approach would overcome the industry’s skepticism. Unless, as the patents suggest, maybe that’s really all there was.
More importantly, where is the evidence that the patented acoustic detection system would provide sufficient advanced notice for the submersible to escape any impending implosion? The patent is notable more for what it lacks than what it discloses. It has a single diagram (which is relatively unusual.) It has no data. It does not show any results from any tests showing application of the purportedly inventive detection system, or how it has performed under different circumstances. It is basically a document that lays out fairly plainly what Stockton Rush may have been thinking, namely, if we have this acoustic detection system, that’s enough to keep us safe. It was just an idea, not a proven concept, and definitely not one proven to the measurable degrees where the danger of 4,000 meters of underwater pressure is sure to intervene.
Patents do not always tell the whole the story. But they can often tell a different side of the story than the one companies tell publicly. And they can be the starting point for questions and further avenues of diligence. And, as OceanGate’s patents show, they can sometimes be just as revealing for what they don’t show, don’t disclose, don’t test.
The investigation into the Titan’s implosion is likely to continue for several more months or even years. Nothing, however, will likely ever alleviate the unfortunate feeling that this tragedy could have been avoided.